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A. Introduction 
This paper will discuss the European Commission Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market (“DSM Proposal”), first put forth as a draft on September 14, 2016,1 
and most recently having been approved by the European Parliament on March 26, 2019 
after undergoing amendments.2 It will discuss in particular Article 13 and its potential impact 
on freedom of expression in the online environment.3 Article 13 introduces direct liability for 
online content-sharing service providers, indicating that a service provider “perform[s] an act 
of communication to the public” in the context of the Proposed Directive when it gives the 
public “access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter uploaded by its 
users.”4 The initial proposal imposes an obligation on service providers that “store and give 
access to large amounts of works and other subject-matter uploaded by their users” to make 
agreements with rightholders to license the use of copyrighted content and prevent the avail-
ability of the content on their platform, using appropriate measures “such as the use of con-
tent recognition technologies.”5 Many leading copyright legal scholars and thousands of pro-
testers, both online and in the streets, fear that the widespread and obligatory use of content 
recognition technology by service providers would unjustifiably infringe on internet users’ 
ability to share and upload information in the EU.6 Content filters are not currently fine-tuned 
enough filter out fair uses of protected material by users,7 and their obligatory use in compli-
ance with the Directive and in order to avoid claims of direct liability for transmission of pro-
tected works uploaded by the users could impact the exercise of the EU Internet user’s right 
to freedom of expression and information under Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (“Charter”).8  
 This paper will consider the DSM Proposal in light of the principle of proportionality test 
as developed by the Court of Justice (“the Court”), discussing whether the DSM Proposal is 
suitable, necessary, and reasonable in order to accomplish the legitimate aim of protecting 
rightholders exclusive rights and right to fair remuneration, without infringing on other funda-
                                                 
1
 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in 
the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final (DSM Proposal). 
2
 European Parliament, Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright and related rights in 
the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC of April 2, 2019, PE-CONS 51/19 
(DSM Directive). 
3
 In the draft approved by the European Parliament on March 26, 2019, this Article has been changed to Article 
17. However, for the sake of clarity, this article will be referred to as Article 13 when discussing the initial proposal 
of September 14, 2016, in keeping with the literature, and as Article 17 when referring to the amended version 
approved on March 26, and released on April 2, 2019. 
4
 DSM Proposal (fn 1), Art. 13; DSM Directive (fn 2), Art. 17. 
5
 DSM Proposal (fn 1), Art. 13(1). 
6
 Frosio, Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 36/2018; Senftleben et al., EIPR 2018, p.149, 149-163; Solomon, HLR 2018, p. 
237, 237-268; Meaker, Inside the giant German protest trying to bring down Article 13, 
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/article-13-protests (last accessed on Apr. 25, 2019). 
7
 See infra, Section D: “The suitability of content filters to close the ‘value gap’”. 
8
 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2012/C O.J. 326/02 (Charter), Art. 11. 
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mental rights in a disproportionate manner. It will first look at the established framework of 
liability for information society providers and their current obligations regarding identifying 
and removing unauthorized posting of protected content. Then it will discuss the develop-
ment of the DSM Proposal, exploring the need for a reform of copyright protection in the EU, 
and the aims of the Proposal, particularly regarding a perceived ‘value gap’ between the au-
thors of works and the content-sharing providers which, it is argued, profit from users sharing 
these protected works on their platforms. It will then discuss the suitability of the proposed 
content filters to the stated goals, and whether other, perhaps better, solutions have been 
seriously considered. It will then discuss the amendments made by the European Parliament 
and ultimately conclude that the amendments do little to ease the issues and impact on free-
dom of expression on the Internet.  
 
B. The Intermediary liability regime: from Berne Convention 
to Information Society Directive 
Internet safe harbors, exempting online service providers from direct liability for any infringing 
content on their websites, originated with the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty in 1996 and were codified into EU law through the Information 
Society Directive9 and the e-Commerce Directive.10 Global copyright protection first emerged 
with the Berne Convention in 1886, which introduced the concept that copyright exists the 
moment a work is fixed in a signatory country, and should be protected without any require-
ments of formal registration.11 The rights protected by the Berne Convention include authors’ 
exclusive right to authorize “communication to the public” of their works.12 Despite its im-
portant role in the development of copyright harmonization, the Berne Convention could not 
account for copyright as the world moved into the digital age, which led to the development 
of the WIPO Copyright Treaty.13 Article 8 of the WIPO treaty helps define authors rights with 
regard to transmission of their works on the internet, giving authors the exclusive right to au-
thorize communications to the public, including when the public is able to “access these 
works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”14 The agreed statement con-
cerning Article 8 of the WIPO Treaty notes that “the mere provision of physical facilities for 
enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the 
                                                 
9
 Council Directive (EC) 2001/29 of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10, (InfoSoc Directive). 
10
 Council Directive (EC) 2000/31 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic 
commerce, in the Internal Market, OJ L 178/1 (e-Commerce Directive). 
11
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as amended on September 28, 1979, WI-
POLex TRT/BERNE/001 (Berne Convention), Art. 5(2). 
12
 Ibid., Art. 11(1)(ii), Art. 11bis(1)(ii), Art. 11ter(1)(ii), Art. 14(1)(ii). 
13
 WIPO Copyright Treaty of December 20, 1996, WIPOLex TRT/WCT/001 (WIPO Treaty), Preamble. 
14
 Ibid., Art. 8. 
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meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention.”15 This language was copied into the Infor-
mation Society Directive (“InfoSoc”) of 2001 which was intended to harmonize the right of 
communication to the public and harmonize protection for acts of “on-demand transmission 
of copyright works.”16 The precise scope and definition of “communication to the public” as 
defined in Article 3(1) of InfoSoc, continues to be crucial to the establishment and exercise of 
the rights of copyright holders, and is interpreted frequently by the Court of Justice in order to 
establish whether an infringement of the copyright holder’s exclusive right of authorization of 
a communication to the public has occurred.17 The InfoSoc Directive expanded rightholders 
rights over the control of the transmission of their works, providing a two-fold exclusive right 
of authorizing and prohibiting any communications to the public of their works.18 
 The e-Commerce Directive of 2000 developed the EU regime of intermediary liability, 
establishing the fundamental principle that intermediary service providers should not be di-
rectly liable for the transmission of protected works through their services when they are un-
aware of the illegal activity and act quickly to remove the offending material when they are 
made aware of it.19 This is the so-called ‘notice and takedown’ framework.20 The other side of 
this principle is a prohibition on Member States from establishing any obligations for online 
providers to perform general monitoring of all information and content on their networks in 
order to identify illegal activities.21 The e-Commerce Directive also obliges Member States “to 
provide online intermediaries, including both access and hosting providers, with exemptions 
to liability for wrongful activities committed by their users.”22 These exemptions were created 
in order to encourage and foster the development of the internet by leaving online service 
providers free of concerns over liability and act as a safeguard against requirements for 
online providers to implement online filtering and to police the content that they host.23 There 
were proposals to hold intermediaries fully liable for the actions of their users but these failed 
to be enacted, and the exemptions did end up being put into place.24 The resulting safe har-
bor regime has been incredibly important for Europe’s emerging Internet market.25 
                                                 
15
 Ibid., Agreed statement concerning Article 8. 
16
 InfoSoc Directive, (fn 9), Art. 3(1), Recitals 23, 25, 27. 
17
 ECJ, Judgment of 8 September 2016, Case C-160/15, GS Media BV, ECLI:EU:C:2016:644, para. 25; ECJ, 
Judgment of 26 April 2017, Case C-527/15, Stichting Brein (Filmspeler), ECLI:EU:C:2017:300, para. 23; ECJ, 
Judgment of 14 June 2017, Case C-610/15, Stichting Brein (Ziggo), ECLI:EU:C:2017:456, para. 19, ECJ, Judg-
ment of 7 August 2018, Case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, ECLI:EU:C:2018:634, para. 13. 
18
 InfoSoc Directive, (fn 9), Art. 3(1). 
19
 E-Commerce Directive, (fn 10), Arts. 12-15. 
20
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment on the modernisation of EU 
copyright rules, COM(2016) 301 final, Part 1/3 (Impact Assessment), p. 147; Urban, PLRP 2017, p. 1, 1; 
Senftleben et al., (fn 6), p. 2; Husovec, EC Proposes Stay-down and Expanded Obligation to License UGC Ser-
vices, http://www.husovec.eu/2016/09/ec-proposes-stay-down-expanded.html (last accessed on Apr. 13, 2019). 
21
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 332; e-Commerce Directive, (fn 10), Art 15. 
22
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 332. 
23
 Ibid., p. 333, 332. 
24
 Ibid., p. 333. 
25
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Digital Single Market Strategy 
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C. Legitimate aim of the Proposal for a Directive 
I. Development of the Directive 
Globally, in recent years there has been pressure on national governments to put in place 
stronger protections of intellectual property and to prevent digital piracy,26 and the EU is not 
immune to this, facing pressure particularly from rightholders.27 In 2015, the Commission 
released the Digital Single Market Strategy (“DSM Strategy”) which set the establishment of 
a functioning Digital Single Market as a key priority of the Commission.28 This included, 
among other things, a need for a “fit for purpose regulatory environment” to govern the roles 
of online platforms and intermediaries.29 It acknowledged the important role that the principle 
of exempting intermediary service providers from liability for the content on their services has 
played in the development of online ventures in Europe, while also indicating that issues with 
the current framework remain.30 In particular that the removal of illegal content is “slow and 
complicated” with lawful material frequently being removed, the differences between national 
systems impede efforts to combat online crime, lack of clarity regarding intermediaries’ liabil-
ity creates legal uncertainty for online service providers, and the presence of a supposed 
‘value gap’ between online platforms and the authors of the content hosted on these plat-
forms offers too little protection for the remuneration of authors.31 These issues necessitate 
harmonization of copyright rules to “safeguard fair remuneration of creators” and clarify the 
roles of intermediary providers regarding actions to prevent and remove protected content 
more effectively.32 For these purposes, the DSM Strategy indicated the possibility of enhanc-
ing protection from the illegal transmission of content by requiring greater responsibility from 
online intermediary providers via a “duty of care.”33  
 The DSM Strategy was followed by a public consultation on online intermediaries and 
platforms, which garnered responses from both platforms and rightholders regarding whether 
the current regulatory framework was fit for purpose for the current online environment and 
sought opinions on the introduction of voluntary measures by online platforms to combat the 
                                                                                                                                                        
for Europe, COM(2015) 192 final (DSM Strategy), p. 12. 
26
 Breindl et al., P&I 2013, p. 27, 27. 
27
 N.N., IFPI Global music report 2016 (IFPI Report), http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2016.pdf, p. 24 (last 
accessed on Apr. 13, 2019). 
28
 DSM Strategy, (fn 25), p. 3. 
29
 Ibid., p. 11. 
30
 Ibid., p. 7, 12; European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Tackling Illegal Con-
tent Online, Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms, COM(2017) 555 final (Communication on 
Enhanced Responsibility), sect. 2. 
31
 DSM Strategy, (fn 25), p. 7, 12; Communication on Enhanced Responsibility, (fn 30), sect. 2. 
32
 DSM Strategy, (fn 25), p. 7, 12; Communication on an Enhanced Responsibility, (fn 30), sect. 2. 
33
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 333; DSM Strategy, (fn 25), p. 12. 
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spread of illegal content online.34 Online platforms responding to the survey indicated worries 
that introducing voluntary cooperation measures to fight large-scale commercial copyright 
infringements would prevent them from being covered by the liability exemption of the e-
Commerce Directive.35 Although the e-Commerce Directive encourages the development of 
cooperation mechanisms, intermediary providers are still hesitant to implement these with 
rightholders as it is uncertain whether doing so would constitute an intervention that then 
makes them no longer neutral parties that fall under safe harbor safeguards.36 On the other 
hand, rightholders complained about the use of their content by online platforms either with-
out authorization or through ‘unfair’ licensing agreements, creating a ‘value gap’ between 
platforms and rightholders.37 The conclusion from these consultations was that there was 
“broad support for the existing principles of the e-Commerce Directive” and therefore the 
Commission would aim to “maintain the existing intermediary liability regime” and in the next 
copyright reforms, aim for a “fairer allocation of value” while clarifying the scope of liability for 
online platforms.38 The Proposal is therefore an update to the copyright framework as a part 
of a larger package of copyright reform, drawing from the DSM Strategy and consultations 
with stakeholders, with Article 13 aimed at closing the ‘value gap’ by ensuring revenue from 
protected works is allocated more fairly and clarifying the liability of online intermediaries and 
platforms. Article 13 imposes an obligation on online service providers that store and allow 
access to copyright protected content to conclude licensing agreements for the use of the 
content with rightholders, to prevent protected works from being made available on their ser-
vices, and indicates the use of content recognition technologies in an appropriate and pro-
portionate manner to achieve these goals.39 This would, presumably, allow rightholders to 
claim more of the value created by the sharing of their content online and reinforce their ex-
clusive right to authorize or prohibit the communications of their works, as protected by the 
InfoSoc Directive. Rightholders in response to the released proposal for the directive lauded 
the Commission’s efforts to reduce the value gap, believing that this measure would correct a 
large distortion in the market.40  
 
 
                                                 
34
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Online Platforms and the Digital 
Single Market Opportunities and Challenges for Europe, COM(2016) 288 final (Communication on OP & DSM), p. 
8. 
35
 Ibid., p. 9. 
36
 Rosati, CWP 2016/11, p. 1, 3. 
37
 Communication on OP & DSM, (fn 34), p. 8. 
38
 Ibid., p. 9. 
39
 DSM Proposal, (fn 1), Art 13(1). 
40
 Ashcroft, PRS for Music Chief Executive Responds to EU Copyright Reform Plans, 
https://www.prsformusic.com/press/2016/prs-for-music-chief-executive-responds-to-eu-copyright-reform (last 
accessed on Apr. 21, 2019). 
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II. The existence of a ‘value gap’  
The ‘value gap’ is a supposed unequal distribution of value created by online content distri-
bution between content-sharing platforms, like YouTube, and rightholders.41 According to 
rightholders, particularly in the music industry, the online distribution market for protected 
works has become distorted, with platforms gaining more revenue from the sharing of works 
than the authors of the works themselves. 42  This allegedly has the effect of hindering 
“growth, innovation, competition, and consumer choice,” and putting rightholders in an un-
balanced negotiation position with online platforms, which can simply refuse to negotiate a 
license and continue to use the notice and takedown framework.43 Under the safe harbor 
regime, instead of online sharing platforms being required to license material from righthold-
ers which their users may upload, thus paying them for the sharing of their content on the 
platform, platforms can simply make agreements to remove offending material when notified 
by rightholders, or voluntarily implement technology to identify material such as YouTube’s 
Content ID.44 The platforms then pay less for the content than, for example, music streaming 
services that have to license the music before allowing access, which results in a gap be-
tween the value added to the platform by the content and the revenue returned to the 
rightholders.45 Rightholders also claim that notice and takedown is ineffective, and does not 
adequately protect artists, but rather favors the development of large online platforms.46  
 The current framework around the concept of a ‘communication to the public’ does not 
allow for passive hosting platforms to be held directly liable for the unauthorized transmission 
of protected works by their users.47 However, rightholders claim that the liability exemptions 
established by the e-Commerce Directive are too broad, and were not intended to apply to 
companies that “actively engage in the distribution of music online.”48 The legal uncertainty 
around the licensing obligations of online platforms and whether or not they perform an ac-
tive role in the transmission of works by making a communication to the public thus allows 
platforms to avoid licensing content and tips the balance of the market towards intermediar-
ies, creating the value gap between authors and platforms.49 The Commission notes these 
concerns from rightholders as a guiding reason behind the development of a new framework 
for intermediary liability, stating that the issues rightholders face in getting proper remunera-
                                                 
41
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Promoting a fair, efficient and 
competitive European copyright-based economy in the Digital Single Market, COM(2016) 592 final (DSM Com-
munication), p. 7; Frosio, (fn 6), p. 337-338. 
42
 IFPI Report, (fn 27), p. 22. 
43
 Ibid., p. 23; Husovec, (fn 20). 
44
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 338. 
45
 Husovec, (fn 20). 
46
 IFPI report, (fn 27), p. 23. 
47
 Rosati, (fn 36), p. 7. 
48
 IFPI report, (fn 27), p. 23. 
49
 Rosati, (fn 36), p. 1-2. 
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tion “undermine the objective that the Digital Single Market delivers a fair return on invest-
ment for all.”50 In other words, due to liability exemptions, the prohibition of general monitor-
ing obligations, and the ineffective notice and takedown framework, rightholders claim that 
they cannot claim the value created by the exchange of their content on content-sharing plat-
forms like YouTube.51  
 However, there is little empirical evidence to support the existence of a ‘value gap,’ nor 
to support the claim that these online platforms actually “actively engage” in the distribution 
of protected content. The value gap was a concept primarily discussed in music industry 
documents before a global music report published after the Commission released the Com-
munication Towards a modern, more European copyright framework.52 The global music 
report praised the Commission for acknowledging the “growing concern” regarding the shar-
ing of value between rightholders and online platforms.53 Rightholders are attempting to 
claim that, given the difficulty of going after individual users and the ubiquity of online shar-
ing, intermediary services should pay for their users at the same price which services selling 
music do.54 Yet if the sharing of protected content was such a large part of the revenue and 
activity on the online platform, platforms would likely not see notice and takedown as prefer-
able to making licensing agreements with rightholders beforehand.55 The Commission itself 
noted that there was little quantitative evidence to support the value gap, saying in the Im-
pact Assessment on copyright modernization that:  
“economic impacts [meaning the value gap] are mostly assessed from a qualitative 
point of view, considering how the different policy options would affect the negotiations 
between those creating or investing in the creation of content and those distributing 
such content online. The limited availability of data in this area . . . did not allow to 
elaborate a quantitative analysis of the impacts of the different policy options.”56 
 Article 13 and any impact it might have on freedom of expression could be justified by 
the aim of rebalancing the distribution of value between rightholders and platforms, yet the 
only ‘evidence’ to suggest that this gap exists comes solely from the music and entertain-
ment industry.57 A report on the effects of piracy on the digital market, commissioned by the 
European Commission and unreleased until an MEP filed a document request, even found 
that there was no significant statistical evidence of online piracy having a negative impact on 
                                                 
50
 DSM Communication, (fn 41), p. 7 
51
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 338. 
52
 Husovec, (fn 20). 
53
 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Towards a modern, more Europe-
an copyright framework, COM(2015) 626 final, p. 9; IFPI report, (fn 27), p. 22. 
54
 Husovec, (fn 20). 
55
 Ibid. 
56
 Impact Assessment, (fn 20), p. 136. 
57
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 361. 
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legal sales.58 It seems that there is absolutely no evidence that online copyright infringement 
has an enormous impact on the revenues earned by creators of content, nor evidence on 
how effective harsher enforcement measures would be in curtailing infringements.59 Studies 
show that copyright reforms which are made considering only large rightholders will result in 
a policy that is ignorant of the impact on and issues facing individual users.60 Nevertheless, 
the European Commission proposed introducing Article 13, a measure to close a value gap 
of which there is no solid evidence, based solely on complaints from rightholders and re-
sponding to concerted lobbying by the music and entertainment industry,61 and not properly 
accounting for the impact on smaller users.  
 
D. The suitability of content filters to close the ‘value gap’ 
Assuming that there is in fact, a value gap, and therefore Article 13 is backed by a legitimate 
aim, the question remains: is content filtering a suitable solution to the goal of ensuring the 
fair remuneration of authors for the online sharing of their content? This question first consid-
ers the effectiveness of content filters to find and remove protected content online. Although 
access service providers are frequently asked to block access to sites containing illegal con-
tent distribution,62 as the Court noted in Scarlet Extended, such a system which requires ac-
tive monitoring of content transmitted through an intermediary would impact fundamental 
rights in a manner which does not fairly balance the right to property and the freedom of ex-
pression.63 In Scarlet Extended, SABAM, a management company responsible for conclud-
ing licensing agreements on the behalf of music artists, applied for an injunction against 
Scarlet Extended SA, an internet access service provider (ISP), which would require them to 
block their customers from using Scarlet Extended’s services to share protected works in 
SABAM’s repertoire without authorization.64 The Court concluded that due to the imprecise 
nature of content filtering, such a system could infringe on freedom of information in that it 
“might not distinguish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the re-
sult that its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications.”65  
                                                 
58
 The report was published after MEP Julia Reda lodged a Freedom of Information request, nearly two years 
after the report was completed; Martin van der Ende et al., Estimating displacement rates of copyrighted content 
in the EU, Final Report, https://juliareda.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/displacement_study.pdf, p. 7 (last ac-
cessed on Apr. 22, 2019); Frosio, (fn 6), p. 362; Houldsworth, Unpublished EU study casts doubt on displacement 
of sales by online infringement, but the reality is nuanced, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4f2b794e-5f2c-4408-8bd6-c3c766365e60 (last accessed on Apr 
22, 2019). 
59
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 362. 
60
 Urban, (fn 20), p. 113. 
61
 IFPI report, (fn 27) p. 24. 
62
 Frosio, IPR 2016, p. 1, 11. 
63
 ECJ, Judgment of 24 November 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA, ECLI:EU:C:2011:771, para. 53. 
64
 Ibid., para. 15, 16, 20. 
65
 Ibid., para. 52. 
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 Indeed, this is the case with respect to YouTube’s Content ID system, a system which 
uses digital fingerprinting to identify infringing material.66 Automated content filters are not 
able to sufficiently distinguish fair use and uses under an exception or limitation from infring-
ing content, and this leads to user-generated content with even a partial match to a protected 
work being flagged as infringing and removed.67 Particularly with works in the public domain, 
content recognition filters may not be able to identify adequately whether the use of this ma-
terial is infringing.68 Additionally, there is the issue of the volume of content flagged as infring-
ing under a filtering system.69 It is simply not feasible for human review to be carried out on 
all material which is flagged, for example, with regards to Internet service providers (“ISPs”), 
as it is too inefficient and would require far too many resources, in terms of hours devoted 
and people needed for the task.70 This means that user-generated content which should be 
considered non-infringing is automatically removed, and users often don’t fight the removal of 
their content because to do so would involve going up against a large multimedia corpora-
tion.71  
 Second, this question asks whether content filtering would result in more value being 
directed towards the authors of the content. Contrary to the claims of rightholders, there is 
evidence which indicates that digital innovation, including the rise of online platforms, actually 
adds value for rightholders, rather than diminishing the value they’re able to claim.72 Online 
piracy can be also seen as an indicator of deficiencies in the current model of content distri-
bution, which has forced the market to innovate in order to respond to the needs of users.73 
In fact, legal scholar Giancarlo Frosio argues that:  
“in the case of illegal online streaming, piracy emerges because content is too pricey or 
wholly unavailable due to distribution restrictions imposed by content licensing. There-
fore, piracy becomes the symptom of a market inefficiency that should be cured by 
meeting users’ demands rather than heavy-handed enforcement approaches and over-
expanding intermediary liability.”74  
However, when the Proposal was drafted, the Commission never considered any evidence 
as to the positive effects on the market of online platforms and digitalization, nor the effec-
tiveness of the current regime.75 Studies on notice and takedown suggest that, particularly in 
                                                 
66
 Solomon, (fn 6), p. 238. 
67
 Ibid., p. 257; Frosio, (fn 6), p. 358. 
68
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 358. 
69
 Solomon, (fn 6), p. 257-8. 
70
 Ibid., p. 257-8. 
71
 Ibid., p. 257. 
72
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 363. 
73
 Ibid., p. 364. 
74
 Frosio, (fn 62), p. 11. 
75
 Frosio, (fn 6), p. 363. 
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comparison to lawsuits, the regime is an “efficient method of enforcement.”76 Thus, with the 
effectiveness of content filtering not proven, and with evidence which suggests that online 
platforms add value rather than take it away from rightholders, Article 13 may not be suitable 
for the purposes of directing value back to rightholders. Imposing content filters could, in fact, 
decrease the value that rightholders currently gain from their content. 
 
E. The necessariness of imposing content filters as com-
pared to other solutions to close the value gap 
The question then becomes whether Article 13 is necessary in order to accomplish the goal 
of ensuring fair remuneration of authors, and if there were other possible measures which 
could accomplish the goal just as well. When the Proposal was being drafted, there was no 
“independent empirical evidence” considered as to the effectiveness of the current regime.77 
By not considering the positive effects of online platforms on the market and the ways in 
which piracy has forced the digital market to innovate in the impact statement, the Commis-
sion is attempting to enact a reform without a full picture of its effects, ignoring other possible 
measures and potentially adopting a measure which does more harm than good.78 Advocate 
General Maduro in Google France v. Louis Vuitton in fact indicated that the current interme-
diary liability regime is better suited to internet intermediary providers, with liability based on 
negligence (i.e. failure to remove infringing content expeditiously) rather than the direct liabil-
ity that Article 13 promises.79 An appropriate balance between the right to intellectual proper-
ty and the right to freedom of expression and information is best maintained through the cur-
rent regime, as the replacement of knowledge and takedown with filtering and monitoring 
obligations will have a ‘chilling effect’ on freedom of expression.80  
 An alternate proposal to direct more revenue back to creators suggests that instead of 
blocking and prevention, copyright reform could introduce an obligation for online platforms 
to conclude monetization agreements with creators, giving the revenues from advertisements 
on the content to creators on the basis of the content’s popularity.81 Instead of blocking the 
content or requiring one-time licensing, creators would gain more compensation from the 
work the more widespread the uses and uploads.82 Rather than restricting the market and 
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adhering to old models of authorizing the communications to the public of their works, EU 
copyright reform could embrace the ubiquity and ease of sharing to even more fairly com-
pensate creators without impacting the freedom of internet users.  
 Considering, then, that the effectiveness of the current regime was not examined with 
independent, empirical evidence, nor was the alternate proposal of monetization agreements 
considered, this suggests that Article 13 is not the only solution to protecting the revenue 
streams of content creators, nor even is it even best possible option to bring copyright law 
into the digital age.  
 
F. The balance of the right to intellectual property against 
freedom of expression 
The Court’s jurisprudence has continually defined and bolstered the exclusive rights of copy-
right holders over their works and the profit obtained therefrom.83 However, despite the im-
portant and worthy goal of ensuring fair remuneration for content creators,84 nothing in the 
Court’s jurisprudence suggests that the right to intellectual property and the right to profit 
from protected works should be upheld above the freedom of expression in all cases. In 
Scarlet Extended, the Court held that there is “nothing whatsoever in the wording of that pro-
vision or in the Court's case-law to suggest that [the right to property] is inviolable and must 
for that reason be absolutely protected.”85 In fact, the Court considers the internet to play an 
important role in the dissemination of information and the fundamental right of freedom of 
expression and information.86  
 
I. Content filters would constitute general monitoring obligations, contrary to 
Article 15 of the e-Commerce Directive 
The use of content filters as indicated in the DSM Proposal would run counter to Article 15 of 
the e-Commerce Directive, constituting a general monitoring obligation. The e-Commerce 
Directive prohibits general monitoring obligations, but allows for Member States to impose 
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monitoring obligations “in a specific case.”87 However, the obligations to prevent protected 
works from being uploaded without licensing demanded by the Proposal would necessitate 
general monitoring; illegal content cannot be prevented without first monitoring all content 
uploaded by users on online platforms.88 Even though the monitoring is for a specific pur-
pose, to protect intellectual property, this cannot be seen as an allowed monitoring obligation 
for a “specific case” as Recital 47 of the e-Commerce Directive allows.89 All information up-
loaded on the platforms, for all users, would have to be actively monitored in order to find 
and identify any infringing material.90 The Court’s case law indicates that monitoring is con-
sidered specific only in cases where it deals with a specific, repeatedly infringing user, or is 
with regard to a specific piece of content, the infringement of which has already been estab-
lished.91 Article 13 would mandate general monitoring, as the use of content filters is not lim-
ited to specific content or areas, but rather, includes all uploads and information shared by 
users of the service.  
 Contrary to the current intermediary liability regime, where knowledge of illegal material 
then entails an obligation to remove it expeditiously, monitoring obligations would “create a 
legal presumption of knowledge on platforms” such that whether the online platforms are 
actually aware of the existence of unlawful material on their platform they will be presumed to 
know and to have employed measures of prevention which were ultimately not effective.92 
Presumably, this is to promote the proactive conclusion of licensing agreements with 
rightholders, however, in order to ensure all protected material uploaded to an online plat-
form is under an authorized use, online platforms would have to negotiate licensing agree-
ments with every possible author of a work which might end up on the platform. Even if the 
reference to the use of content filters in order to prevent future uploads of unauthorized con-
tent was removed, the imposition of direct liability and an obligation to prevent material from 
being uploaded illegally would essentially enforce a continuing duty to monitor, or online plat-
forms would open themselves up to a high risk of many successful copyright infringement 
lawsuits against them.  
 The DSM Proposal runs counter to CJEU jurisprudence on filtering and monitoring ob-
ligations, which has been quite clear in enforcing the e-Commerce Directive’s prohibition on 
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the imposition of general monitoring obligations.93 In the SABAM cases, the Court held that 
adopting an injunction imposing a filtering system that would process all of the information 
hosted by an ISP or hosting service provider in order to identify copyright infringement would 
not strike a fair balance between the right to property and other fundamental rights, including 
the freedom to receive and impart information.94 In Netlog, the Court ruled on the appropri-
ateness of the same kind of measures which the Proposal would introduce, and it plainly 
ruled that imposing such a filtering measure would be incompatible with fundamental rights, 
including freedom of expression.95 Netlog was a social networking platform similar to Face-
book, which allowed users to communicate with friends, fill out a personal profile and share 
videos, photos, messages and other material.96 SABAM, a management company for musi-
cal artists responsible for concluding licensing agreements on the behalf of the artists, filed 
for an injunction against the social network to oblige it to stop publishing works in SABAM’s 
repertoire, claiming that Netlog was making protected works available without concluding a 
licensing agreement.97 Netlog argued that imposing this type of injunction obliging Netlog to 
cease making available protected works uploaded by their users would constitute a measure 
which required general monitoring of the content of the network in order to filter through, 
identify and prevent the availability of works to which SABAM held the licensing rights by 
blocking the exchange of the material.98 The Court agreed with this, and noted that such a 
measure requiring the social network to use a filtering system to prevent and block the avail-
ability of works licensed to the artists protected by SABAM,  
“could potentially undermine freedom of information, since that system might not distin-
guish adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its 
introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful communications. Indeed, it is not con-
tested that the reply to the question whether a transmission is lawful also depends on 
the application of statutory exceptions to copyright which vary from one Member State 
to another. In addition, in some Member States certain works fall within the public do-
main or may be posted online free of charge by the authors concerned.”99 
In this way, general filtering and monitoring obligations might infringe on the right to freedom 
of expression in the Charter of Fundamental Rights.100  
 The Proposal is also inconsistent with the Union’s acquis communautaire with regard to 
the balance between fundamental rights and existing copyright principles. Notably, the e-
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Commerce Directive obliges hosting services to respect freedom of expression when decid-
ing on the removal of infringing content.101 This imposes a duty to use care and considera-
tion, weighing the fundamental rights involved, before content is removed or access is disa-
bled.102 Notice and takedown therefore has a built-in safety mechanism protecting freedom of 
expression, as it forces the material to be carefully considered before being removed.103 
Thus, automated filters simply cannot be in compliance with this obligation, making providers 
hosting providers non-compliant with the e-Commerce Directive when implementing the con-
tent filters required by the Proposal.104 This would make the notice and takedown framework 
that is fundamental to the functioning of the e-Commerce Directive basically irrelevant, while 
maintaining that the e-Commerce Directive is still technically in force.105  
 
II. The DSM Proposal expands the definition of communication to the public 
The Court’s case law indicates that it interprets the definition of communication to the public 
as laid out in Article 3(1) of InfoSoc in light of the purposes of the directive, which is a broad 
level of protection for authors and ensuring they are able to claim fair remuneration for the 
communication of their works.106 The role that an internet user plays in making the work 
available to the public or to a ‘new public’ is crucial to determine whether it is a communica-
tion to the public, namely whether the user pursues a profit in providing access to the 
work.107 When they pursue a profit in posting or sharing access to a work, there is a pre-
sumption that they have checked to ensure that the work is legally published on the initial 
website, and such a user then knows or should have known that the consequences of their 
actions would be to illegally share protected works.108  
 Based on the results of the impact assessment on copyright modernization discussed 
previously, the Commission concluded that while there was necessary reform, the existing 
intermediary liability regime would be maintained.109 However, the DSM Proposal departs 
from the safe harbor regime by imposing direct liability on online platforms, stating in Recital 
38 that,  
“[w]here information society service providers store and provide access to the public to 
copyright protected works or other subject-matter uploaded by their users, thereby go-
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ing beyond the mere provision of physical facilities and performing an act of communi-
cation to the public, they are obliged to conclude licensing agreements with righthold-
ers, unless they are eligible for the liability exemption provided in Article 14 of Directive 
2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.”110 
 The scope of communication to the public is thereby expanded to include that when 
online service providers store and provide access to user-uploaded protected works, they are 
automatically not merely providing a physical facility for making a communication, and this 
act of hosting the content constitutes an act of communication to the public.111 This is similar 
to what the Court held in Ziggo, where even when the exchange of copyright protected mate-
rial is conducted solely by the users through such a website, the operators of that website, by 
creating and managing an online sharing platform which makes the exchange of this material 
easier “intervene, with full knowledge of the consequences of their conduct, to provide ac-
cess to protected works.”112 However, it should be noted that the content-sharing platform 
referred to in the above-reference case was one which was used exclusively for exchanging 
“torrent” files, meaning it was a platform set up for the sole purpose of exchanging copyright-
ed material without the authorization of the rightholders, where the managers of the platform 
could not have been unaware of the illegal activity, rather than a hosting platform like Face-
book, Reddit or YouTube where the main function is not facilitating online piracy.113 It re-
mains to be seen whether the Court would rule that online content-sharing services whose 
main purposes is not to facilitate online piracy also make a communication to the public 
simply by managing and providing a platform that makes the exchange of such material eas-
ier. 
 
III. Chilling effects on users’ ability to make use of copyright exceptions and 
limitations  
Content filtering is an imprecise tool, one which is currently unable to distinguish protected 
content used under an exception or limitation of exclusive rights from infringing content, such 
as public domain works, as the Court noted above.114  Therefore lawful content is often 
flagged and removed by the automated systems, along with unlawful content.115 The impre-
cise nature of the technology leading to a lot of lawful material being flagged and removed 
could cause ‘chilling effects’ where users don’t want to upload content for fear of being nailed 
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with a copyright infringement notice.116 With the way that YouTube, for example, deals with 
repeated copyright infringers, this could lead to small video content creators using material 
under an exception or limitation,117 but having their videos flagged for copyright infringe-
ments, leading to their videos being removed or their accounts terminated and thus severely 
impacting their ability to share information on the internet. Content filtering systems, by virtue 
of the amount of ‘false positives’ in flagging infringing content, hinder the ability of individual 
users to make use of exceptions like the right to use copyright protected works parody and 
quotation.118 The vast amount of content which would be required to be filtered would impose 
an unreasonable burden on online platforms by sheer virtue of the vast volume of content 
which is uploaded onto online platforms every single day. The Court noted in Netlog that 
such an imposition would be an unreasonable infringement on the online platform’s freedom 
to conduct a business under Article 16 of the Charter, given the long duration of the applica-
tion of such measures, their application to current and future infringements, and their applica-
tion to protect works which are not yet in existence, as well as the costly and complicated 
nature of the filtering system.119  
 
IV. Favoring of mass media holders over small content creators and individual 
users 
The InfoSoc Directive, the current reigning law on copyright in the EU, was drafted and came 
into force long before the advent of many of these content sharing platforms, meaning that 
the law is governing means of creation which did not exist at the time the Directive came into 
force.120 As such, copyright law lags behind in accounting for the new ways that content is 
created and shared,121 leaning more in favor of mass media rightholders, rather than the 
small content creators that account for much of the material shared and viewed on these 
platforms.122 Filtering measures like YouTube’s Content ID not only falsely identify content as 
infringing, failing to allow users to make use of exceptions under copyright law, they also 
deprive them of the fair remuneration from their own content.123 When Content ID flags a 
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video as using protected content without a license the rightholder can request YouTube to 
monetize the video instead of blocking it, and direct the ad revenue back to the rightholder 
and YouTube, to the exclusion of the content creator, irrespective of whether or not they’ve 
monetized the video themselves.124 However, this can happen regardless of the amount of 
infringing content in a video.125 This means that, for example, if a content creator makes use 
of a small clip of music in a video otherwise shot and edited by them, a successful infringe-
ment claim would take away all of the profits they might have made from that video, regard-
less of the amount of infringing material as compared to original work.126 The uploader is 
therefore deprived of their right to their intellectual property in favor of the mass media com-
pany.127 This unfair balance, favoring the mass media companies, has a chilling effect by 
scaring small users away from uploading and creating content because of the threat of a 
lawsuit for copyright infringement.128 The ability of internet users to make use of exceptions 
and limitations to the right of communication would thereby be impacted by the DSM Pro-
posal, consequently impacting their right to freedom of expression and information.129  
 
 
G. The Amended Proposal changes little with regards to the 
impact on freedom of expression  
 After widespread protests from Internet users across Europe on March 23rd, particular-
ly in Germany, and strong opposition from online platforms,130 the European Parliament ap-
proved a new draft of the Directive on March 26, 2019, which amended the text of Article 13 
(now Article 17) considerably, making the application of the article more explicit. Many hoped 
that the widespread advocacy would inspire European lawmakers to reconsider the Di-
rective,131 yet these amendments do little more than offer appeasement to an irate public, 
while still maintaining the core principles of the article, and having the potential to seriously 
impact freedom of expression and information on the internet. Julia Reda, a Pirate Party 
MEP and one of the most vocal opponents of Article 13, called the passing of the DSM Di-
rective through the European Parliament a “dark day for internet freedom.”132 The amended 
article still considers online platforms to be making a communication to the public by giving 
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access to protected works uploaded by their users and therefore imposes an obligation to 
conclude licensing agreements.133 The European Parliament has removed the mention of 
content recognition technology, but the Article retains the imposition of direct liability,134 and a 
requirement to prevent protected material from being uploaded without authorization, apply-
ing to current and future works.135 Despite the fact that the amended article prohibits Member 
States from imposing general monitoring obligations,136 the imposition of direct liability and 
requirement to prevent the availability of protected works effectively means that online plat-
forms will have no choice but to institute general monitoring to diminish their liability for copy-
right infringements.  
 The amended text now more clearly specifies which online platforms are covered under 
this Directive. The Directive applies to “online content-sharing service providers” which are 
defined as online providers that:  
“as part of their normal use, are designed to give access to the public to copyright-
protected content or other subject matter uploaded by their users. The definition of an 
online content-sharing service provider laid down in this Directive should target only 
online services that play an important role on the online content market by competing 
with other online content services, such as online audio and video streaming services, 
for the same audiences…with the purpose of obtaining profit therefrom, either directly 
or indirectly, by organising it and promoting it in order to attract a larger audience, in-
cluding by categorising it and using targeted promotion within it.”137  
Recital 62 goes on to explicitly exclude scientific and education sharing platforms, online 
encyclopedias, online marketplaces, digital personal storage sites and open source software 
platforms.138 An important thing to note is that the end of this recital then says that the liability 
exemption provided for in this Directive should not apply to online platforms whose main pur-
pose is facilitating piracy.139 This distinction between platforms whose main purpose is facili-
tating online piracy, and platforms which “play an important role” in the digital market and 
compete with online streaming services clearly indicates that this Directive is aimed at regu-
lating platforms like YouTube which supposedly compete with paid streaming services like 
Hulu or Netflix for the ‘same audiences.’  
 Article 17(1) changes the liability of online platforms from the current intermediary liabil-
ity regime, saying that:  
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“an online content-sharing service provider performs an act of communication to the 
public or an act of making available to the public for the purposes of this Directive when 
it gives the public access to copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter 
uploaded by its users. 
 An online content-sharing service provider shall therefore obtain an authorisation 
from the rightholders … in order to communicate to the public or make available to the 
public works or other subject matter.”140 
This Article therefore still makes online platforms directly liable just as the proposed Article 
13 does, indicating that through infringing user uploads, the platform makes a communication 
to the public by giving the public access to these uploads, and maintains the obligation for 
online platforms to conclude licensing agreements with rightholders. Article 17(3) then goes 
on to explicitly say that the limitation on liability established in Article 14(1) of the e-
Commerce Directive does not apply for communications to the public by online platforms, as 
defined by this Directive. This means that the requirement for “actual knowledge of illegal 
activity”141 in order to establish liability is removed for online content-sharing platforms. Thus, 
online content-sharing platforms are liable for any copyright infringing material their users 
upload if there is no licensing agreement concluded between the platform and the rightholder 
or the user and the rightholder, regardless of whether they have knowledge of it.  
 Article 17(4) goes on to establish a limited liability exemption for unauthorized commu-
nications of works, as long as the platform (1) “made best efforts” to conclude an agreement 
or acquire authorization,142 (2) made “best efforts to ensure the unavailability” of works that 
the rightholders have provided sufficient information about,143 and (3) removed content “ex-
peditiously” upon a substantiated notice from the rightholders and made best efforts to pre-
vent that specific content from being uploaded in the future.144  
 
H. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the DSM Directive will still impose direct liability on online content-
sharing platforms. While this no longer explicitly requires content filtering, the obligations 
imposed by the Directive, namely preventing the availability of protected works, will essential-
ly force platforms to adopt general monitoring measures. The use of content filters is not ad-
vanced enough and finely tuned to be able to pick out uses under exceptions and limitations, 
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and thus will lead to lawful material being flagged as infringing. This could have an extremely 
detrimental effect on freedom of expression on the internet, creating a chilling effect, and 
keeping smaller content creators out of the market. It is worth mentioning that the Article 
does emphasize that in the implementation of the Directive, fundamental rights such as the 
freedom of expression should be respected, particularly with regards to uses for parody, pas-
tiche and quotation in Article 17(7), however, the ways in which Article 17 is structured, and 
the proven risks to freedom of expression as discussed in this paper indicate that the DSM 
Directive will still have a detrimental impact on freedom of expression, if it is executed in this 
form by Member States.  
 xxi 
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